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On 15 November 2020, the reformist, pro-European candidate Maia Sandu has
won the presidential election in the Republic of Moldova. Sandu has raised great
expectations among the population that she will eradicate corruption and mitigate
the devastating effects of COVID-19. As the confetti has been swept away and the
euphoria about her victory is passing, it is doubtful, whether President Sandu can
deliver on her campaign promises, given the President’s limited powers and the
composition of parliament.
After her defeat four years ago, Sandu now gained a landslide victory against the
incumbent revisionist, pro-Russian president Igor Dodon. In one of the highest
voter turnouts in Moldovan history, nearly 58% have placed their trust in her to
tackle pressing domestic issues. Moldova is a state captured by vested interests.
On Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index it ranks among the
most corrupt countries in the world: high-level corruption is endemic and widespread
and Moldovan citizens have a deeply rooted mistrust of state institutions. As a
consequence of a weak healthcare system, lacking administrative capacities and
limited budgetary room for maneuver, the spread of of the latest Coronavirus strain
has brought Moldova a health and socio-economic crisis. The European Bank for
Development and Reconstruction forecasts a 4% drop in GDP.
What can the Moldovan president actually do?
To push forward her anti-corruption agenda, Sandu is fully dependent on the
political support in Parliament. As Moldova is a parliamentary democracy, the
Moldovan constitution grants the President only limited legal competences. The
political power in Moldova lies with the executive branch, which stands and falls
with the majority of the members of Parliament – the supreme representative body
of the Moldovan people (Art. 60). As Head of State (Art. 77(1)), the President’s
main duties encompass representing Moldova externally (Art. 86), preserving
national unity and mediating across party political lines (Art. 77(2)), promulgating
laws (Art. 93) and appointing public officials and awarding decorations, titles of
honor and ranks (Art. 88). While the President has key competences in the area of
foreign policy and national defence, their powers are restricted by the Parliament’s
mandate. International treaties concluded by the President need to be ratified by
the Parliament to enter into force (Art. 86(1)). As Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, the President may declare partial or general mobilization of the armed forces,
but they need the prior approval of Parliament (Art. 87(2)).
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Early parliamentary elections – the „President’s
road“ to reform?
Against the backdrop of limited competences, her closest political advisors and
even Sandu herself have argued that as President she will be able to push forward
her reformist agenda once the Parliament is dissolved. The rationale behind
this proposition is that in the case of early parliamentary elections, the current
momentum for reformist political forces created by Sandu’s victory could be used
to haul her Party for Action and Solidarity (PAS) to the top of the political party
landscape. Latest polls indicate that this approach could actually work. Sandu
thus hopes to replicate her predecessor’s way of exercising power: by controlling
the Socialist Party, the biggest party in Parliament, as well as the prime minister,
Dodon has been able to arbitrarily set Moldova’s political agenda since November
2019. But President Sandu does not have the power to just call early parliamentary
elections. According to Art. 85 of the constitution, early elections are possible in only
two cases: if the Parliament is unable to adopt laws for a period of three months
(paragraph 1) or if it fails repeatedly to install a government in the course of 45 days
(paragraphs 1 and 2).
Matching the legal framework with the political
reality
Moldova’s current Parliament is perceived to have the lowest legitimacy in decades
and more than half of Moldovan citizens are in favour of early elections. However,
in the Moldovan political context, none of the two options stipulated in Art. 85 are
currently on the table. According to polls from 9 November 2020, most of the political
forces in Parliament will either not pass the 5% threshold for entry into parliament or
will secure fewer seats, should there be early elections. Moreover, the overwhelming
majority of Members of Parliament belongs to different vested interest groups.
These include Dodon’s Socialist Party, the „Pro Moldova“ Party of the ousted but
still influential oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc and the party of Ilan Shor, a convicted
criminal who is believed to be the architect of the “theft of the century”. As a result of
the fraud scheme, $1 billion were laundered through Moldovan banks between 2010
and 2014 and transferred to bank accounts in the EU, all of which was facilitated and
concealed by the political and judicial elite in the country. In spite of previous political
battles between the Socialist Party and Plahotniuc’s loyalists sitting in Parliament,
Sandu’s election and her reformist agenda will serve as a strong unifying factor
from now onwards. Sandu’s goal to tackle high-level corruption and state capture
does not only significantly threaten the interests but the very preservation of power
of these groups. As early elections would likely see these threats materialise, their
common primary goal is to maintain the status quo and thus to avoid a stalemate in
adopting law that would trigger early elections.
For the same reasons, a vote of no confidence against the minority government,
which would require the vote of the majority of the members of Parliament and
potentially lead to a stalemate fulfilling the prerequisites of Art. 85(2) of the Moldovan
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constitution, is equally unlikely. Even though the current minority government is
officially only supported by the Socialist Party, it is fully functional. As has happened
in the past, the Democratic Party, „Pro Moldova“ and the party of Shor are likely to
form informal coalitions and vote for common sense, urgent government initiatives,
including the budgetary-fiscal policy, state budget for 2021 and legislation with a
social dimension, while hiding behind the pretext that early elections would cause a
waste of public money and lead to a deep political crisis.
No glimmer of hope for reformist political forces in
Moldova
Given these legal and political circumstances, Sandu suffers from an ambitions-
capability gap. Contrary to public declarations, all that is left for Sandu and her
PAS is to continue their relentless anti-corruption and de-oligarchisation discourse,
without being able to do anything about it. Too many are the tentacles of the veto
players and too little is Sandu’s room for manoeuvre.
A second problem that Sandu will have to grapple with are the effects of a partially
self-inflicted expectations-capability gap. The unrealistically high expectations
towards Sandu, caused by a domestic issues-driven campaign and the high degree
of dissatisfaction of Moldovan citizens with the political elite, bear the potential of
general public disillusionment. This plays into the hands of her political adversaries
who will try to profit from the arising cynicism and caricature Sandu as a lame duck
first, before eventually giving way to early parliamentary elections.
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